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1 
Tushnet’s Lawless World 
 
A Response to Mark Tushnet, Book Review, Epstein’s Best of 
All Possible Worlds: The Rule of Law, 80 U Chi L Rev 487 
(2013). 
 
Richard A. Epstein† 
I did not pick this unfortunate fight, but it is my regrettable 
task to have to respond to Professor Mark Tushnet’s Review of 
my book Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administra-
tion and the Rule of Law.1 Professor Tushnet regards Design for 
Liberty as a quixotic endeavor to reform the world, worthy of 
Glenn Beck,2 driven by a political naiveté that reminds him of 
an improbable cross between Candide and Mr. Micawber.3 
Throughout his Review, he uses his not inconsiderable rhetorical 
skills to mock a book whose message and argument he does not 
understand. 
A grizzled hanger-on from the largely defunct Critical Legal 
Studies movement, Professor Tushnet’s subpar performance 
stems from a combination of three interrelated defects: his in-
grained skepticism of legal rules; his narrow intellectual focus 
that incorporates nothing outside of constitutional law; and his 
inveterate intellectual laziness, which makes it impossible for 
him to stick with a problem long enough to understand it. Pro-
fessor Tushnet has always played an enfant terrible who believes 
that all efforts to create rule-bound structures are bound to dis-
integrate in failure. On narrow focus, his bibliography reveals a 
person who, over his thirty-year academic career, has not written 
 
 † Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter 
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distin-
guished Service Professor Emeritus of Law and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chi-
cago Law School. My thanks to Peter Horn and Benjamin Margo, NYU Law School Class 
of 2014 for their excellent research decision on an earlier draft of this Response. 
 1 Richard A. Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration 
and the Rule of Law (Harvard 2011). 
 2 Mark Tushnet, Epstein’s Best of All Possible Worlds: The Rule of Law, 80 U Chi L 
Rev 487, 510 (2013). 
 3 Id at 487–88, 513. 
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a single book or article on contracts, property, tort, or indeed any 
common law subject,4 which are the focus of much of Design for 
Liberty. Finally, Professor Tushnet never cites any book or arti-
cle, including those cited in the footnotes, that I have written to 
support the conclusions that I reach on the topics covered in De-
sign for Liberty. 
Professor Tushnet’s crippling weaknesses leave him unable 
to grasp the mission of the book, which uses the lens of private 
law to integrate the three elements set out in its subtitle: pri-
vate property, public administration, and the rule of law. Here, 
as in my short book, it is not possible to develop in-depth posi-
tions that I have written about at length elsewhere. Yet the only 
way to explain the larger picture is to place some of the particu-
lars that have been examined elsewhere into the background. 
Nonetheless, in this short response, I hope to give some indica-
tions as to how this program can be carried out.  
To do so, it is useful to address four issues. The first of these 
deals with Professor Tushnet’s misguided views on the plasticity 
of language and its relationship to the rule of law. The second 
explains how best to establish empirically the connection be-
tween a content-neutral rule-of-law standard and the classical 
liberal synthesis of private property, contractual freedom, and 
limited government. The third addresses the interrelationship 
between per se rules and reasonableness standards, contrasting 
the classical liberal approach with the modern realist one, in the 
context of common law decision making and government regula-
tion. The fourth uses this approach to examine some particular 
issues on which the folly of Professor Tushnet’s views becomes 
clear. These include his failure to understand the basic structure 
of intellectual property law; his inability to understand the dis-
tinction between health and safety regulation on the one side, 
and economic regulation on the other; the baleful consequenc-
es for judicial administration that this breakdown has in con-
nection with land use development; and his unpardonable con-
stitutional insensitivity to the exercise of religion in public 
institutions. 
 
 4 Mark Tushnet, Bibliography, online at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
directory/index.html?id=534&show=bibliography (visited Mar 25, 2013). 
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I.  THE CLARITY OF LANGUAGE—THE REALIST CHALLENGE 
One of the general preconditions for developing and defend-
ing the rule of law is that it must be possible to formulate rules 
in the first place. Rules must be general enough to cover more 
than the particular cases that come before them, but specific 
enough to allow the fair-minded user to determine the vast bulk 
of cases. Rules are different from the direct orders that a judge 
may make to a litigant, or a policeman to a citizen, in that their 
articulation almost always requires the use of presumptions to 
which it is then possible to craft rule-like exceptions.5 From very 
early times, it has been understood that even the exceptions to 
rules admit of exceptions, which in turn admit of further excep-
tions. One simple example of this chain of argument is the cycle 
that starts with the nonperformance of a promise, to which a 
statute of limitations is interposed, which in turn is overcome in 
whole or in part by the plaintiff’s waiver of the claim or ratifica-
tion of the earlier promises.6 It takes hard work to rationalize 
these sequential qualifications, and many mistakes can be made 
along the way. My defense of the common law method is not a 
positive description of how most common law judges work today. 
More often it is a relentless critique of their mistaken approach, 
for it is precisely the persistent movement away from rules to 
multifactor balancing tests that generates so much disarray in 
the legal system. My job here is a normative effort to improve by 
successive approximations the overall efficiency of the system. 
One key to this venture is the ability to recognize that we 
can attach sensible meanings to difficult terms. As I argue in 
Design for Liberty, the sure sign that a legal analysis is going off 
the rails stems from Professor Tushnet’s crude form of legal 
skepticism that this laudable endeavor is even remotely possi-
ble. At one point in Design for Liberty, I criticized Professors Rob-
ert L. Hale7 and Frank Michelman,8 both highly distinguished 
 
 5 For a discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U Chi 
Rev 556, 557–61 (1973) (describing law as a system of presumptions). For its early ori-
gins, see Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius, bk IV, §§ 126–29 at 283–85 (Clarendon 1946) 
(Francis de Zulueta, ed). 
 6 For a discussion, see John P. Dawson, et al, Contracts: Cases and Comment 214–
15 (West 9th ed 2008). 
 7 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 14 (cited in note 1), citing Richard A. Epstein, 
Skepticism and Freedom: A Modern Case for Classical Liberalism 110–14 (Chicago 2003) 
(criticizing Professor Hale’s expansion of the term “coercion”). 
 8 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 14 (cited in note 1) (criticizing Professor Michel-
man’s expansion of the term “nuisance”). 
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scholars, for their willingness to extend the meanings, respec-
tively, of the key terms “coercion” and “nuisance.” These two 
terms carry enormous weight in the legal literature. If coercion 
can apply to any refusal to deal, and not just those by a common 
carrier with monopoly power, there is no space left for voluntary 
transactions, which is why the rule in general is otherwise.9 If 
the tort of nuisance has no clearly delineated lines, the police 
power can swallow the rights to private property, and for that 
matter, those of personal liberty as well. It is to forestall that 
dizzying descent that “the rule of law requires a degree of lin-
guistic clarity that allows for the articulation of any set of com-
prehensible rules, regardless of their content, which others can 
choose to obey or disobey.”10 
I hardly think that this modest point should send any read-
er into fits of anguish or rage. Professor Tushnet then quotes me 
as saying, “[T]he global view that all language is so unclear as to 
preclude the formulation of any rules has this direct conse-
quence: it leads to the disintegration of political and legal dis-
course.”11 To which his response runs as follows: 
Presented without elaboration as a critique of the “global 
view,” this is nonsense. As stated, the form of the argument 
is, “Were X to be true, there would be dire consequences; 
therefore X is false.” To which the response is, “Tough luck.” 
Consider an assertion in the same form: “Were it to be true 
that human actions contribute to worldwide climate change, 
there would be dire consequences; therefore human actions 
do not contribute to worldwide climate change.”12 
There are multiple difficulties with this response. His odd 
analogy to global warming is off point because my observation is 
not directed to a hotly disputed scientific proposition beyond the 
ken of everyday human experience. The ability to communicate 
effectively in ordinary life is not a fact that is easily controvert-
ed. In ordinary conversations, people routinely detect and cor-
rect semantic and syntactic mistakes precisely because of their 
sophisticated powers of communication. Indeed, unlike Professor 
Tushnet, most people are willing to acknowledge their mistakes 
 
 9 See Epstein, Design for Liberty at 61 n 6 (cited in note 1), citing Allnut v Inglis, 
104 Eng Rep 206 (KB 1810). 
 10 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 14–15 (cited in note 1). 
 11 Id at 15. 
 12 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 493 (cited in note 2). 
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on both factual and moral questions when pointed out to them. 
No one, for example, routinely will say “so what?” to a charge 
that they have neglected to perform a promise. As the theory of 
presumptions makes clear, they would, and on a daily basis do, 
either apologize or offer some concrete excuse or justification for 
their behavior. The commonplace would be the miraculous if 
language were not capable of more precision than Professor 
Tushnet is ever willing to acknowledge. The argument to the con-
trary is just false, no matter what one thinks of global warming. 
More specifically, it is worth noting how Professor Tushnet 
caricatures the argument by cutting the quotation, such that the 
“[T]” replaces the introductory phrase in the sentence which 
reads: “While it is proper to expose ambiguity in particular in-
stances—especially when it can be clarified by better writ-
ing . . . .”13 This is a caveat that hardly seems like nonsense in 
light of the enormous consequences of taking just that jaundiced 
view toward the terms “coercion” and “nuisance.” Ironically, Pro-
fessor Tushnet falls into exactly this trap later in his Review 
when he claims that terms like “property” and “nuisance” “have 
no determinate content, which means that the judges must ac-
tually be relying on something else to resolve the dispute.”14 
What that something else is he never mentions because he does 
not know. Instead, Professor Tushnet launches into a juvenile 
philosophical riff about rule sets “consisting of rules, subrules, 
exceptions to the rules, qualifications to the subrules, and 
more,”15 without committing himself to the method of interlock-
ing presumptions that affords the only workable way to untan-
gle the conceptual knots. The best response to this jumbled line 
of thought was written by Professors H.L.A. Hart and Tony 
Honoré years ago in their classic book Causation in the Law: 
It is fatally easy and has become increasingly common to 
make the transition from the exhilarating discovery that 
complex words like “cause” cannot be simply defined and 
have no “one true meaning” to the mistaken conclusion that 
they have no meaning worth bothering about at all, but are 
used as a mere disguise for arbitrary decision or judicial 
 
 13 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 15 (cited in note 1). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 506 (cited in note 2). 
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policy. This is blinding error, and legal language and reason 
will never be understood while it persists.16 
Professor Tushnet falls headlong into this trap by throwing 
up his hands because he cannot imagine or figure out how dif-
ferent claims fit together in a comprehensive whole. Clearly, he 
ignores my efforts in that direction, which, for example, offer a 
unified account of tort liability that finds a place for all three 
dominant theories—strict liability, negligence, and intentional 
harms.17 Instead, he argues incorrectly that at the end of the 
day, everything boils down to “using the rules as a mask for de-
termining what’s reasonable all things considered,”18 without 
having the foggiest idea of what factors go into the mix or how. 
In order to defend his thin position, he is duty bound to explain 
the errors in specific proposals that he prefers to reject out of 
hand. Unfortunately, he does not attempt to do that with even 
one area, even though he could have offered some views on the 
relationship of tort law, with its defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk, to the system of workers’ compen-
sation laws that largely displaced it in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century. On that question, he could have looked at 
my article on the topic of workers’ compensation law,19 which is 
cited in the book.20 But why bother to learn anything about the 
subject when your mind is already made up that open-ended 
reasonableness standards dominate any alternative approach? 
II.  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The serious difficulties with the project of reclaiming the rule 
of law are, then, not linguistic. Instead, the chronic weakness 
within the classical liberal tradition has been its unsubstantiated 
 
 16 H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law 3 (Oxford 1959). Indeed, I 
think that Professors Hart and Honoré did make many errors on points of detail in the 
concept. But it is precisely because they are so careful that these can be identified and 
corrected. See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability 
in Context, 3 J Tort L art 6, 24–26 (Jan 2010).  
 17 See Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Lia-
bility, 3 J Legal Stud 165, 213–15 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J Le-
gal Stud 391, 398–408 (1975) (outlining such a system); Epstein, Skepticism and Free-
dom at 84–107 (cited in note 7). 
 18 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 507 (cited in note 2). 
 19 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Struc-
ture of Workers’ Compensation, 16 Ga L Rev 775 (1982) (examining the development of 
the modern system of workers’ compensation liability and potential threats to the cur-
rent system). 
 20 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 124 n 12 (cited in note 1). 
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insistence that there is some necessary or logical connection be-
tween the standard notions of the rule of law and the dominant 
institution of private property. Professor Jeremy Waldron, as I 
noted,21 rightly challenged assertions of that sort on the ground 
that there is nothing about the specification of the usual essen-
tials of the rule of law—consistency, publicity, clarity, and the 
want of retroactivity22—that logically entails a legal system of 
private property and limited government.23 Rather, the univer-
sal appeal of these constraints on the rule of law is that they are 
devoid of substantive content, which in principle means that 
they can be married with any set of substantive rules. But by 
the same token, the burden of my argument is that in practice 
large administrative schemes will tend to break down, often 
massively, in the modern social democratic state in ways that 
private property systems will not. 
A stable system of property rights requires universal for-
bearance whereby others agree not to enter the land of another 
or commit nuisances—nontrespassory invasions of land—with 
some interesting modifications for negative easements, all of 
which I have examined previously.24 Professor Tushnet hints at 
the point in passing25 but never acknowledges how this simple 
configuration of rights not only solves the notice problem, but al-
so has three other virtues: First, they are scalable, which means 
that the same account of mutual forbearance prevails whether 
we deal with a society of 100 thousand people or 100 million.26 
The set of rights is complete among all people at all times, and 
the content of the rights is invariant to population growth or 
changes in population composition. The transaction costs sav-
ings of this approach should be evident. Second, the simplicity of 
the rules gives effective public notice to the world that allows 
people to conform their actions to the dictates of the law. Third, 
the private system is insensitive to the wealth of a society as a 
whole, or of the individuals within it. There is, therefore, no 
 
 21 Id at 12 n 5. 
 22 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39 (Yale 1964). 
 23 Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the Rule of Law, 1 Legisprudence 91, 97–108 
(2007). 
 24 There are further complications with negative reciprocal covenants that I shall 
not discuss here, but which I examined in Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Com-
plex World 329 (Harvard 1995) (justifying some negative reciprocal easements on the 
ground that the property owner values the easement more than the diminution of his 
own property rights).  
 25 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 495 (cited in note 2). 
 26 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 74 (cited in note 1). 
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need to recalibrate these basic relations as people get either 
richer or poorer, which must always be done with any modern 
system that champions positive rights, be they to health care or 
to an education.27 Under the traditional approach, there is no 
need to ask how to balance the costs of the entitlement against 
the revenues that must be collected to fund them, as must be 
done with Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid. Again, the 
safeguard against political instability is great. 
Once these basic property rights among strangers are well 
defined, the law of contract allows for every person to enter into 
cooperative arrangements with those self-selected parties with 
whom it is most likely to secure gains from trade, subject to an 
important constraint on practices that promote monopolization. 
Under this view, it is necessary to preserve a narrow definition 
of interference unless all competition is regarded as potentially 
tortious so that the scope of government intervention becomes 
enormous, and with it the possibility of creating the kinds of car-
tels that were routinely supported in dealing with various kinds 
of agricultural products.28 But the social problem of monopoly 
does not once attract Professor Tushnet’s attention, although 
discussion of that issue pervades Design for Liberty.29 
Professor Tushnet shows a similar blind eye to the role of 
reasonableness in legal discourse, to which he assigns virtually 
universal significance. But the proper role of the term in many 
contexts is both necessary and limited. As I develop the point, 
reasonableness, properly construed, always plays a back-up role 
in those systems where it is possible to implement consistent 
property rules—that is, those which will result in zero accidents 
that generate liability when everyone complies.30 This condition 
is not as exacting as it sounds, for it only demands that the op-
erators of the public roads make sure that north-south and east-
west traffic don’t both have green lights at the same time. 
As a first approximation, in the simple two-party case we 
can develop four boxes depending on who deviates from the rules 
of the road. In one box, neither party deviates from the rules, so 
there is no responsibility at all, for whatever odd accidents occur 
 
 27 Id at 75. 
 28 For a discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Cartelization of Commerce, 22 
Harv J L & Pub Pol 209, 210–11 (1998). For a more detailed development of the same 
theme, see Michael S. Greve, The Upside Down Constitution 201–20 (Harvard 2012).  
 29 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 56–57, 70 (cited in note 1). 
 30 Id at 31–42. 
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are attributable to acts of God. In the second box, one side devi-
ates from the rules of the road, and the other does not, at which 
point 100/0 allocations are appropriate for all harms. The same 
holds true when the roles of the two parties are reversed, only 
now the allocation is 0/100. The difficult cases, relatively small 
in number, are those where both sides deviate from the rules of 
the road. In most cases the correct response is normally a 50/50 
division, given that pure comparative negligence principles in-
troduce uncertainty and expense without improving incentives.31 
The situation above assumed that each party acted in igno-
rance of the conduct of the other. Reasonableness enters the sys-
tem when one party gains knowledge that the other has violated 
the rules of the road. At this point, it would be mindless to insist 
that the innocent party need not alter his conduct in light of the 
perceived circumstances. Behind a veil of ignorance, everyone 
would prefer that the innocent party not plow full speed into an-
other driver who has run the red light. But what precautions 
should be taken? The endless variations invite the use of a rea-
sonableness standard, with both its objective and subjective 
component, because no one set rule can cover all the possible 
scenarios that arise in light of the unexpected change. It would 
be pointless to insist that someone who is trying his best to 
avoid harm guess the right result every time or be held equally 
culpable as the other party. The best that can be done is to in-
centivize people to seek the right solution by punishing them if 
they show a reckless indifference to the unfolding events.  
The rules that embed these elements are the so-called 
emergency rule32 and the last clear chance rule,33 both of which 
are unfortunately in decline under modern law, which tends to 
adopt an open-ended pure comparative negligence system that 
can never quite make itself operational.34 It will result in some 
mistakes. Yet by cordoning off most routine cases from this rea-
sonableness inquiry, the law resolves most disputes quickly and 
accurately without the routine free-for-all disputes that Profes-
sor Tushnet envisions. By having a clear sense of what parties 
 
 31 For discussion, see Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World at 329 (cited in 
note 24). 
 32 See, for example, Lyons v Midnight Sun Transportation Services, Inc, 928 P2d 
1202, 1203 (Alaska 1996) (summarizing and rejecting the emergency rule). 
 33 See, for example, Fuller v Illinois Cent R Co, 56 So 783, 786 (Miss 1911) (apply-
ing the last clear chance doctrine). 
 34 For a harbinger of the decline, see Li v Yellow Cab Co of California, 532 P2d 
1226, 1240–42 (Cal 1975) (folding last clear chance into the calculus). 
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are required to maximize, the residual reasonableness cases are 
that much easier to handle. Judicial administration in highway 
accidents could be further improved by knocking out such de-
fenses as epilepsy and insanity, but these arise in too few cases 
to really matter. The same cannot be said about infancy, which 
if allowed to alter rights and duties would make for nightmarish 
complications, all rightly resisted by a per se rule that makes 
compliance or noncompliance the test of negligence.35 
Reasonableness, however, takes on a very different complex-
ion when it becomes the sole source of liability in all cases. Just 
that unfortunate transformation has happened in both medical 
malpractice and product liability law, and by the same mecha-
nisms.36 The first stage is to reject the relatively clear guidelines 
at work in both of these areas. The use of an unbending stand-
ard of custom, which goes a long way to keep the law of medical 
malpractice on an even keel, tends to be pushed aside.37 Similar-
ly, the open and obvious defect defense in both design and warn-
ings cases of products liability could have gained some much 
needed rigor by allowing recovery only for latent defects that 
cause harm for products in their original condition while in 
normal and proper use, which ironically was the standard that 
Justice Roger Traynor adapted in his strict liability concurrence 
in Escola v Coca Cola Bottling Co of Fresno.38 These tests are in-
tended to give content to a notion of reasonableness that can be 
made operational in ordinary cases.  
The next step is to eliminate all efforts by service suppliers 
to control potential liability by contractual limitations. The key 
landmarks in that journey were the 1960 decision in Henningsen 
v Bloomfield Motors, Inc,39 for product liability cases, and the 
1963 decision for medical malpractice cases in Tunkl v Regents 
 
 35 Richard A. Epstein, The Irrelevance of the Hand Formula: How Institutional Ar-
rangements Structure Tort Liability, in Jef De Mot, ed, Vrank en Vrij: Liber Amicorum 
Boudewijn Bouckaert 65 (Die Keure 2012). 
 36 For a discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Con-
tract, 1976 Am Bar Found Rsrch J 87, 91–108; Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Li-
ability Law (Greenwood 1980). 
 37 For the evolution of custom, see generally Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. 
Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J Legal Stud 1 (1992). 
 38 150 P2d 436, 444 (Cal 1944) (Traynor concurring) (“The manufacturer’s liability 
should, of course, be defined in terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use, 
and should not extend to injuries that cannot be traced to the product as it reached the 
market.”). 
 39 161 A2d 69, 84–96 (NJ 1960). 
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of the University of California.40 Those two decisions opened the 
path for the unbounded reasonableness tests that were best em-
bodied in Professor John W. Wade’s risk/utility factors,41 which 
ushered in the vast expansion of product liability law. The 
change is well captured in just two cases that show what hap-
pens when the notion of reasonableness is not moored to any 
stronger conception of substantive law. In Campo v Scofield,42 
Judge Stanley H. Fuld put the point thusly: 
[T]he manufacturer has the right to expect that such per-
sons will do everything necessary to avoid such contact, for 
the very nature of the article gives notice and warning of 
the consequences to be expected, of the injuries to be suf-
fered. In other words, the manufacturer is under no duty to 
render a machine or other article “more” safe as long as the 
danger to be avoided is obvious and patent to all.43 
Yet twenty-six years later, in Micallef v Miehle Co, Division of 
Miehle–Goss Dexter, Inc,44 Judge Lawrence H. Cooke opened his 
broadside attack on Campo with this terse remark: “The time 
has come to depart from the patent danger rule enunciated in 
Campo v. Scofield.”45  
 The key difficulty with the “reasonableness writ large” ap-
proach is that it cannot explain why one approach is better than 
the other. But a clearer understanding that the earlier rule 
overcomes all dangers of asymmetrical information while enlist-
ing optimal precautions from both sides does explain why the re-
treat from rules is as disastrous in the common law context as it 
is in the statutory context. That result only gets worse in the 
Supreme Court’s dreadful decision in Wyeth v Levine,46 which re-
fuses to allow FDA warnings to control the issue in product lia-
bility cases.47 Professor Tushnet has nothing substantive to say 
about the case; nor does he answer the critique that I offered of 
 
 40 383 P2d 441, 446–47 (Cal 1963) (en banc). 
 41 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss L J 
825, 837–38 (1973). 
 42 95 NE2d 802 (NY 1950). 
 43 Id at 804 (emphasis added). 
 44 348 NE2d 571 (NY 1976). 
 45 Id at 573. 
 46 555 US 555 (2009). 
 47 Id at 563–81. 
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it.48 Yet the Court’s great sin was to allow open-ended, ex post 
adjudications of the reasonableness of warnings on an issue that 
can be resolved cleanly, once and for all, by a standardized agen-
cy warning that gives complete protection against duty-to-warn 
liability for firms that comply with it. That one modification can 
eliminate the huge dislocations that come with the current 
common law rule. Professor Tushnet’s all-encompassing reason-
ableness test has proved the undoing of the common law of torts. 
Yet there is nothing inevitable about the rise of reasonableness, 
given that the alternative approach had been in place for many 
years. 
The same analysis could easily apply to many forms of regu-
lations that are challenged on either takings or due process 
grounds.49 There is no time to go into the matter here, but the 
basic impulse is to reduce overall government discretion by 
three devices. First, the just compensation limitation never al-
lows the state to take or to regulate without having to take the 
price of its actions into account. Consistently applied, that one 
principle prevents the state from initiating negative sum games 
in the form of fractional transfer payments that can rip a society 
apart, as routinely happens today in zoning and landmark des-
ignation cases.50 Next, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
works to divide the social surplus from positive sum projects 
equally among various participants so that it is not frittered 
away in factional strife.51 Finally, a flat tax on either income or 
consumption should be the only revenue collection mechanism 
because it allows the government to raise what revenues it 
needs, again without playing favorites among its citizens. Oth-
erwise, a large set of special taxes will be imposed, some of 
which will be ruinous until repealed, and others of which create 
undue uncertainty in the bargain.52 When meshed together, 
 
 48 See Epstein, Design for Liberty at 41 n 15 (cited in note 1), citing Richard A. Ep-
stein, What Tort Theory Tells Us about Federal Preemption: The Tragic Saga of Wyeth v. 
Levine, 65 NYU Ann Surv Am L 485 (2010). 
 49 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent 
Domain 100–04 (Harvard 1985) (discussing regulatory takings). 
 50 See id. 
 51 See Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 98–103 (Princeton 1993). 
 52 For the ruinous variety, see Eric Felten, How the Taxman Cleared the Dance 
Floor, Wall St J A13 (Mar 17, 2013). For the luxury boat tax, see Penny Singer, Luxury-
Tax Repeal Encourages Sellers, NY Times WC12 (Oct 3, 1993). For medical devices, see 
Kim Dixon, U.S. Senate May Back Symbolic Repeal of Medical Device Tax, Reuters (Mar 
21, 2013), online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/21/usa-tax-medical-device 
-idUSL1N0CDGB120130321 (visited Mar 25, 2013). 
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these private law systems minimize political actors’ level of dis-
cretion to transfer wealth from less- to more-favored constituen-
cies. This tripartite approach goes a long way, first, to knocking 
out all negative sum transactions and, second, to maximizing the 
gain from the positive sum transactions that go forward. 
This brief account of these basic public and private rules ex-
erts a positive influence on the middle piece of Design for Liber-
ty’s title—public administration—by cabining the discretion of 
public officials by avoiding the difficulties of creating any system 
of positive rights. Once government activity is limited to a class 
of well-defined issues, it should be possible for more qualified 
people to attend to the basic governance functions, and thus re-
duce the opportunities for individuals to game the system by 
removing any of these constitutional constraints. It is an open 
question whether a system this austere could withstand any of 
the massive claims for income and wealth redistribution, which 
right now are tearing this nation apart. But even if those claims 
are accepted, their administration will be far easier in a flat tax 
regime when overall wealth levels are higher and ordinary peo-
ple have more market opportunities. To allow for this configura-
tion, I have defended the approach that asks governments to 
adopt a stance that considers “redistribution last.”53 First liber-
alize market arrangements and then see what is left to be done. 
Professor Tushnet thinks that the widespread concern with eco-
nomic stagnation and the mounting deficit are idle conservative 
pabulum. I beg to disagree, and think that the slow recovery is 
directly attributable to policies that block gains from trade in 
labor, real estate, and lending markets, while piling on heavy 
social obligations that drag down the economy. Even the most 
generous application of the redistribution last approach will 
produce a smaller government and a more prosperous nation 
than we have today. 
III.  TUSHNET’S SPECIFIC MISTAKES 
Given this general framework it is worth spending a few 
moments on some of the particular cases that Professor Tushnet 
mangles in his overall analysis. Here are four particular discus-
sions that illustrate his deep confusions on such key topics as in-
tellectual property law, health and safety regulation, real estate 
development, and religious freedom. Let me take these up in order. 
 
 53 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 148 (cited in note 1). 
EPSTEIN_ONLINE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013 2:44 PM 
14  The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue [80:1 
   
A. Patent Infringement and Trademark Dilution 
Professor Tushnet objects that the account of private prop-
erty that I have given does not seem to address, “except meta-
phorically,” such common institutions as patents and trade dilu-
tion.54 But there is nothing metaphorical about these 
relationships. I gave a short account of some of the key resem-
blances in Design for Liberty by stressing how the use of strong 
injunctions against infringement and free licensing—subject on-
ly to antitrust constraints—should be the norm.55 I also ex-
plained why it is that limited terms make sense for patents, 
since there is a downside to their perpetual exclusive use, given 
that nonrivalrous use of inventions is possible in ways that are 
not possible for land. As usual, I footnoted a reference to a re-
cent article that gives an exhaustive account of these issues, 
which Professor Tushnet ignores.56  
It is also evident that he does not understand the first thing 
about this topic when he speculates that “we ought to think 
about whether there might be equally metaphorical trespass or 
nuisances on real property. The prime candidate for trespass is, 
unfortunately, reducing the value of property by setting up a 
competing business down the block.”57 His intellectual careless-
ness gets the better of him. The central opposition in real estate 
law—indeed in many areas of law—is that between physical in-
vasions and market competition, where the former leads to neg-
ative sum outcomes and the latter to positive sum outcomes, 
which is why they should receive different legal treatments. This 
stark opposition needs modification with intellectual property 
because there can be no physical entrance in patent cases, where 
the use of another patent is what should trigger the per se obliga-
tion to compensate.58 Whether we deal with physical or intangible 
property, the same distinction holds: invasion or infringement is a 
 
 54 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 495 (cited in note 2). 
 55 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 165 (cited in note 1). 
 56 Id at 164, citing Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? 
A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan L Rev 455 (2010). See 
also Richard A. Epstein, What Is So Special about Intangible Property? The Case for In-
telligent Carryovers, in Geoffrey A. Manne and Joshua D. Wright, eds, Competition Poli-
cy and Patent Law under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation 42, 42–76 (Cambridge 
2011). For a discussion in a much more technical vein, see generally Richard A. Epstein, 
The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents under the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 Food & Drug L J 285 (2011).  
 57 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 496 (cited in note 2). 
 58 See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets under the 
Takings Clause, 71 U Chi L Rev 57, 61–62 (2004). 
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negative sum game, while competition is a positive sum game. 
This is a distinction that never enters into the social calculus of 
the free-wheeling Professor Tushnet. 
His analytical sloppiness carries over to the question of 
trademark dilution, a well-recognized head of liability.59 Profes-
sor Tushnet confesses that he cannot see “what property law 
rule ‘carries over to support the dilution cause of action.’”60 But 
libertarian theory says otherwise. The party who uses another’s 
name makes a false representation to the world that his product 
is that of another person. The imitator’s reference to the owner’s 
brand or product is not randomly chosen. It belongs to the per-
son whose strong reputation is now being appropriated to help 
the competitive rival. At the same time, the improper use of the 
brand adds more noise to the signal, which is the loss associated 
with trademark dilution. In principle, the innocent party should 
have, by way of analogy to trespass, the choice of remedy be-
tween damages for harm caused to its own brand or restitution 
for benefits taken. Both of these are difficult to measure, which 
is why injunctive relief is provided to cope with continuing 
harm. These harms matter, even though the loss in question 
does not come, as in the typical case, from a direct competitor, 
which tends to attenuate the total loss. The trademark action is 
intended to forestall that form of dilution. The tort contains 
many tricky points, but the only point that is clear is how no-
tions of misrepresentation, so central to libertarian thought, car-
ry over to this area. 
B. Regulation: Health or Safety versus Competition  
Professor Tushnet’s weak grasp of intellectual property car-
ries over to his understanding of the role of regulation in dealing 
with both public and private property. Early on in his Review, 
and with evident despair, Professor Tushnet takes me to task for 
this sentence, which attempts to draw the line between permis-
sible and impermissible government action: 
The government that can stop the use of dangerous equip-
ment on private construction sites or issue drivers’ licenses 
for the operation of motor vehicles on public roads need not 
 
 59 See, for example, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-312, 
120 Stat 1730, codified at 15 USC § 1051 et seq (redefining the requirements and reme-
dies for trademark dilution liability). 
 60 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 496 (cited in note 2). 
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be given the power to plan comprehensively what buildings 
should be built where and for what purposes people shall take 
the highways.61 
He then asks, “What on earth does Epstein have in mind? 
HOV [high occupancy vehicle] lanes? Congestion pricing?”62 Let 
me explain it to him. Start with public roads. The first point to 
note is that the government as operator of the basic system has 
management responsibilities that cannot be reduced simply to 
the control of accidents, which is discussed above. It also is un-
der some duty to maximize the value of the system, which cer-
tainly includes the use of HOV lanes if those will smooth the 
flow of traffic. To Professor Tushnet this is a source of modest 
wonderment when he writes: “A deep libertarian might not con-
cede that the government has the power to construct highways, 
but Epstein’s libertarianism does not seem to run that deep.”63 
But why doubt my libertarian credentials in the first place when 
the control and operation of the system is something that easily 
falls to the state under a classical liberal theory that accepts the 
need for government action to handle network industries and 
coordination problems—a position that I have always held.64 
Once that classical liberal perspective is kept firmly in mind, it 
is perfectly natural to insist that the purpose of highway man-
agement is to maximize the net use value of the system, and 
then to use constitutional arguments that bless arrangements 
that tend in that direction, while attacking those that work 
against that objective. 
At this point, the general split comes into view. In the first 
place, all safety regulations are needed to ensure the smooth 
flow of traffic and set the framework not only for tort liability, 
but for fines and license suspensions. Not that hard. Next, the 
state should clearly be allowed to issue licenses to parties to 
prevent the very kinds of harms that they could be held respon-
sible for in tort. And surely congestion pricing falls within that 
ambit as well. 
What Professor Tushnet misses is that there are things that 
governments have regulated that manifestly fall outside that 
 
 61 Id at 492, quoting Epstein, Design for Liberty at 8 (cited in note 1). 
 62 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 492 (cited in note 2). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See, for example, Epstein, Bargaining with the State at 161–77 (cited in note 51). 
See also Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom at 124–26 (cited in note 7). The title gives some 
clue as to the intellectual orientation. 
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situation because of their explicit anticompetitive nature. The 
courts began reviewing this practice in cases such as Frost & Frost 
Trucking Co v Railroad Commission of California,65 which invali-
dated a California statute that forced private carriers to take all 
freight just as if they were common carriers.66 For example, 
Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,67 which required 
any new entrant into the trucking industry to receive a “certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity.”68 In the name of cur-
tailing cutthroat competition, that statute restricted new firms 
from entering the trucking business, and imposed route and rate 
restrictions, which competitors were allowed to challenge, and 
authorized regional rate bureaus to set rates in what should 
have been competitive markets.69 It often issued perverse regu-
lations that allowed a carrier to carry, say, tiles in one direction 
while requiring it to head back to the place of origin empty 
handed.70 Similarly, with the Communications Act of 1934,71 the 
same public interest, convenience, and necessity standard re-
stricted entry into the telecommunications business.72 How could 
Professor Tushnet not understand these references to the gov-
ernment’s excessive regulatory control over public roads? 
Likewise, on the private side it is imperative that govern-
ment run inspections for defective equipment that can cause 
damage on construction sites. It is equally important that it 
regulate access to and from private lands. But it hardly follows 
that the modern zoning laws should dictate what kind of hous-
ing should be built on what land, or require that all new con-
struction contain certain minimum amounts of affordable hous-
ing, or meet specific disability access standards. The costs of 
meeting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199073 housing 
 
 65 271 US 583 (1926). 
 66 Id at 599. This case is discussed at length in Epstein, Bargaining with the State 
at 162–64 (cited in note 51). 
 67 Pub L No 74-255, ch 498, 49 Stat 543. 
 68 Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat at 551. 
 69 For the gory details, see Thomas Gale Moore, Trucking Deregulation, in David R. 
Henderson, ed, Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (Liberty Fund 1st ed 1993), online at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/TruckingDeregulation.html (visited Mar 26, 2013). 
 70 See id.  
 71 Pub L No 73-416, ch 651, 48 Stat 1064, codified as amended at 47 USC § 151 et seq. 
 72 See FCC v National Broadcasting Co, 319 US 239, 240 (1943). For a critique of 
the practice, see R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J L & Econ 1, 
17–40 (1959) (arguing that the broadcasting industry does not pose special dangers justi-
fying heightened government regulation). 
 73 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
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requirements often reach 20 percent of new construction. Indeed, 
there are regulations that afford some limited relief when the 
costs go above that amount, subject to the inevitable technical 
qualifications and exceptions.74 The benefits are just a fraction of 
the revenues expended. The critical line between health and 
safety on the one hand, and anticompetitive or factional legisla-
tion on the other, should not escape Professor Tushnet, who has 
at least some passing acquaintance with constitutional law. But 
it does. 
C. Real Estate Development. 
 The same abuse from large government is nowhere more 
apparent than in connection with real estate development. For 
many years I have taken the position that the comprehensive 
form of ex ante review of permitting is both a dangerous and un-
constitutional exercise of the permit power of local government.75 
The massive defects in the current permit system go to both 
means and ends. First, the number of ends for which govern-
ment regulation is permissible has expanded far beyond the sen-
sible limits imposed by the law of nuisance. Second, the govern-
ment is granted far too much latitude in choosing the means to 
reach those ends. One major concern is that the collective review 
process does not follow the sensible private law rules on injunc-
tions, which have two parts. First, there is no injunction until 
there is actual or imminent harm, which means that most pro-
jects go to completion free of delay.76 Second, when actual or 
imminent damage does occur, the builder is shut down until he 
makes the appropriate accommodations to obviate the harm.77 
In pointing out the dangers of the modern system, I in-
stanced one account where a Northern California developer, 
Doug Kaplan, recounted his multiple difficulties in securing the 
requisite building permits.78 Professor Tushnet cleverly distorts 
that account, by acting as if Mr. Kaplan made an isolated obser-
vation that “an application [ ] ‘must be submitted by phone to a 
 
 74 28 CFR 36.403(f) (requiring that certain alterations made to buildings make the 
altered area accessible to all, unless the cost of accessibility exceeds 20 percent of the 
cost of the alteration). 
 75 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 
81 Iowa L Rev 407, 414–18 (1995). 
 76 Id at 411–14. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 116 (cited in note 1). 
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public official who is never in his office.’”79 Next, he makes ex-
cuses for this apparent lapse of good judgment by noting—and 
here I quote his disingenuous account: 
[E]xamining the source on which Epstein relies, one discov-
ers that the problem was not that the official was never in 
his office, but rather that the official accepted phone applica-
tions only during a narrow window of time (perhaps because 
he was charged with other duties as well, though the source 
does not go into that). The problem, that is, is that the offi-
cial’s supervisors had allocated—or misallocated—resources 
in a manner inconsistent with sound public administration.80 
No one “discovers” Professor Tushnet’s beguiling excuses. 
The problem that Kaplan identified is massively systemic, not 
oddly idiosyncratic. Here is the full passage I quoted from 
Kaplan immediately following from Professor Tushnet’s snippet: 
We submitted 17 sets of plans that were routed to the 14 
separate departments, agencies and individuals who were 
charged with issuing the dozen separate approvals we need-
ed to build our 2,700-square-foot building. By the time we 
were finished, we had passed an all-too-familiar milestone 
in our community: The number of government employees 
involved in the review and processing of our permits out-
numbered the number of construction workers who would 
eventually build the building.81 
What innocent excuses can be made for this endurance con-
test? The point of the passage was to show that as the class of 
permissible ends increases, the entire process grinds to a halt. 
Professor Tushnet seems to think that he makes his case by 
showing that somehow I think that “this behavior is in principle 
part of sound public administration, which of course it is not.”82 
We all agree that public administration should be more efficient. 
But the basic point is the one that Professor Tushnet does not 
address; namely, that it becomes difficult to follow the principles 
 
 79 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 492 (cited in note 2), quoting Epstein, Design for Lib-
erty at 116 (cited in note 1). 
 80 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 501 (cited in note 2). 
 81 Doug Kaplan, Simplify, Don’t Subsidize: The Right Way to Support Private Devel-
opment, 4 Persp on Eminent Domain Abuse 1, 5 (2008), online at http://www 
.eminentdomainabuse.com/images/publications/perspectives-simplify.pdf (visited Mar 26, 
2013). 
 82 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 501 (cited in note 2).  
EPSTEIN_ONLINE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013 2:44 PM 
20  The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue [80:1 
   
of sound administration when those who wield power are given 
so many levers that it becomes impossible to engage in ordinary 
construction. As the night follows the day, the ability to expedite 
or delay administrative review can be used to block the entry of 
potential competitors or new residents. The short-term local vic-
tories presage long-term breakdowns in places like California 
and New York as each local maneuver tends to create long-term 
dislocations. No one should want to make excuses for those pa-
rochial forms of conduct. But Professor Tushnet does, in his role 
as apologist for the bloated administrative state. 
D. Unconstitutional Conditions and Religious Liberty 
Professor Tushnet’s deep confusions also carry over from 
property to religion. One central theme of Design for Liberty is, 
of course, the dangers that come from extensive government ac-
tion, which allow the state either to waive or enforce rights 
against specific parties. My phrase, “Government by Waiver,”83 
helps to capture the risk. This issue arises with any major pro-
gram, including the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act,84 which I address in Chapter 13 of Design for Liberty.85 
Professor Tushnet seeks to make light of these considera-
tions by dismissing my treatment of Christian Legal Society 
Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law v Martinez86 (“CLS”). In CLS, the Supreme Court, by a five-
to-four vote, held that Hastings College of Law was within its 
right to exclude members of the CLS from the use of its bulletin 
boards and other collateral services routinely given to all other 
Hastings student groups.87 Why? Because the CLS on religious 
grounds refused to admit those individuals who did not sub-
scribe to its fundamental beliefs, which included its rejection of 
homosexuality and its strong conviction that sex should only take 
place within marriage. In her decision for the Court, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg revived an old and discredited distinction 
 
 83 Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, 7 Natl Affairs 39 (2011). For the con-
trary view, see David J. Barron and Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum L 
Rev 265 (2013). 
 84 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 85 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 172–89 (cited in note 1). 
 86 130 S Ct 2971 (2010). 
 87 Id at 2995. 
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by insisting that it was just fine that Hastings “merely” denied a 
benefit to the CLS without inflicting harm on the CLS.88 
In my view, CLS was incorrect under the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions, which recognizes the constraint that the 
state’s monopoly position places on its ability to discriminate 
among users of its own facilities. Within a “limited public forum” 
it can exclude persons who are not connected to the school, but it 
cannot pick and choose favorites among its students for these 
extra benefits.89 Professor Tushnet disagrees with this conclu-
sion, without bothering to discuss the explicit antireligious im-
pact on which the exclusion rested. Indeed, he thinks that my 
argument is fatally flawed because it rests on some unarticulat-
ed account of the “essential functions” of the college, which could 
in his view be not just education, but “education plus character 
formation,” that gives Hastings the full discretion to choose sen-
sible means to limit is newly chosen end.90 
In making this point, Professor Tushnet is blissfully una-
ware of the obvious offensiveness of his new formulation, as if 
devout Christians pose a threat to character formation. Does he 
really believe that the character formation argument would be 
sufficient to allow the state to exclude all potential members of 
the CLS from attending the law school on the ground of their 
supposed character deficits? Under the First Amendment, how-
ever, that viewpoint discrimination would draw the highest level 
of scrutiny and Hastings would, and should, lose in a rout. 
The simple point here is that the state could not exclude 
these Christian students from membership in the CLS, and it 
cannot therefore impose the lesser ban on students’ full and 
equal enjoyment of the various benefits conferred on other stu-
dents in other groups. The First Amendment surely offers that 
protection for Marxist students. Why not for the tiny minority of 
Hastings students who do not want their religious organization 
to be overrun by nonbelievers? Why then keep them from bulletin 
boards? Professor Tushnet seems oblivious to the point and con-
cludes from his bizarre example that “the project of developing a 
 
 88 Id at 2986. 
 89 For the record, I filed a brief for the Cato Institute in the case, and wrote exten-
sively about it afterwards. See Richard A Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads: 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 2009–10 Cato S Ct Rev 105. Just the invocation of 
the Cato name gives rise to hoots of derision from Professor Tushnet, who dismisses its 
work as “conservative pabulum.” Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 492 (cited in note 2). His 
work here does not come close to the level of excellence found in Cato publications. 
 90 Tushnet, 80 U Chi L Rev at 500 (cited in note 2). 
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system of private law based on a set of strong property rights, 
while possible in principle is impossible in practice.”91 But to the 
extent that one can decipher his dense prose, he gets this back-
ward. There is no difficulty in private competitive organizations 
setting their own admission standards, but there is every reason 
to prevent public institutions, supported with tax dollars, from 
making that same distinction. 
CONCLUSION 
My central thesis is that, as has often proved the case, it 
should be possible in both private and public law to develop 
well-articulated rules that sharply limit the level of discretion 
that regulators and judges need to design particular institutions 
and decide particular cases. These rules can be formulated in 
ways that optimize the value of property rights and contractual 
relations, and thus protect private arrangements from the con-
stant factual intrigue that can divide public sentiment and sap 
private initiative. That system also contains comprehensive 
rules governing government initiatives for takings and regulat-
ing private property, and for the distribution of public benefits, 
which achieves the same end. Let the system be properly exe-
cuted and it goes a long way to fulfilling this fundamental social 
objective: each voluntary private and publicly initiated action 
tends to maximize the social gain from a set of positive sum 
transactions. There is nothing narrow or parochial about the 
choice of ends. Nor is there anything utopian about the means 
that I support, for many of them were once in common use, even 
if they have fallen into desuetude today. 
Professor Tushnet’s Review of Design for Liberty heaps 
scorn upon the enterprise, but offers no detailed alternative 
blueprint. Instead, Professor Tushnet conjures up an ersatz le-
gal philosophy that is a deadly combination of the unwholesome 
negativism of Critical Legal Studies and the unwise desire to 
vest judges and administrative officials alike with dangerous 
running room by downplaying the role of rules in the organiza-
tion of our legal affairs. It is indeed the case that the margins of 
every legal system must resort to notions of reasonableness to 
resolve some borderline cases. But by the same token a good le-
gal system sets the rules of the road that allow people to organ-
ize their private affairs by conforming their conduct to sensible 
 
 91 Id. 
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rules that simultaneously limit the discretion of public officials. 
I do not think that it is a utopian vision to insist that modern so-
cieties can form these rules. In many cases, all that is required 
is for both judges and public officials to return to many of the 
practices that dominated American life and culture before the 
rise of the progressive revolution that took hold during the New 
Deal. The truth is that the rule of law cannot survive the rise of 
the modern administrative state. The classical writers that 
linked the rule of law to the institutions of private property and 
freedom of contract were wrong insofar as they thought that this 
tight connection was a matter of intellectual necessity. But the 
truth remains every bit as important, even if it is only a contin-
gent empirical truth, that these traditional institutions offer the 
greatest protection against tyranny and the greatest opportunity 
for human advancement. Deep down Professor Tushnet must 
sense the vulnerabilities of his chaotic position, which is why 
he lashes out against a book that offends his own ingrained 
prejudices. 
